The continuity of underperforming ICT projects in the public sector
Introduction
Within public-sector settings information and communications technology (ICT) is now viewed as a catalyst of growth and transformation [49, 50] . Governments are increasingly initiating innovative projects by leveraging the power of ICT [see 28, 34] . It is widely acknowledged that diffusion of such public information and communications technology (PICT) 1 projects is a key driver for inclusive development and better governance [18, 33] . Unlike their private sector counterparts, which are almost always concerned only with business objectives, ICT deployments in the public sector aim to use technology extensively to also address issues of social inclusion, transparency, decentralized delivery of public services, public accountability and governance [8, 19, 46] . Increasingly, many PICT projects are also launched with the objective of cutting down costs in government departments [19] . While they share many characteristics with other public sector initiatives,
PICT projects are distinctive in that their outcomes are intimately connected with the properties inscribed in ICT and with how human actors' attribute multiple meanings to, and socially shape, technology.
The actual impact of such ambitious PICT projects remains a point of much debate with some studies suggesting that 60-80% of them end in failure [ see 19] . Especially in settings that are similar to this paper's empirical sections (i.e., emerging economy contexts)
there is even more emphatic evidence that PICT projects don't do very well. Choudhuri [8] points out that despite receiving overwhelming support from stakeholders, PICT projects in a number of emerging economy sectors have struggled to meet their objectives. For instance, dubious outcomes in the case of health-sector PICT projects have been vividly demonstrated and discussed at length [see 30, 38, 39, 40] . A more recent example which underlines the question marks surrounding PICT projects is India's Unique Identification Project [see 15, 31] . This project seeks to associate every citizen with a unique identification number in order to help them gain better access to government programs and other essential services.
However, since its initiation the project has become entangled in so many difficult political and ideological disputes that it appears to be a long way off from meeting any of its intended goals [see 31].
Although extant studies have documented many instances of PICT projects whose objectives were not met, there remains an important gap in the literature. Very few studies have examined how and why some PICT projects persist and continue when they are clearly underperforming in many areas. To better understand the processes underlying such a continuation of PICT projects, we draw on the notion of institutional continuity [25, 42] .
Here, we apply the idea of continuity to the specific case of PICT projects and define PICT project continuity as the long-term persistence of underperforming PICT projects. Analyzing and explaining the influences on continuity can provide important insights into the forces that shape the trajectory of PICT projects. They also help develop a deeper understanding of PICT projects and may challenge the conventional wisdom that successful projects continue and poorly performing ones get terminated. From a practical perspective, an in-depth analysis of continuity can alert public policy designers to potential structural weaknesses underlying PICT projects.
While there is scarce research on the continuity of underperforming PICT projects, some studies, although not focusing on continuity per se, provide important clues about this phenomenon. These studies can be broadly categorized into two groups. The first group of studies seem to relate continuity of projects to the dominance of institutional norms and discourses. For instance, drawing on a study of an innovative PICT project in India,
Ravishankar [34] suggests that certain cultural contexts might be normatively inclined to suggest that particular institutional logics [12, 27, 40, 45] could guide projects through difficult periods and weak outcomes. Hence our first research question in this paper is: How do institutional logics influence PICT project continuity?
A second group of studies point to the likely influence of vested interests on the continuity of projects. Keil [21] showed how competitive rivalries between groups and the desire to protect one's status can result in an escalation of commitment to a failing IT project.
Similarly, Allen [1] points out that because of their interest in maintaining status-quo, actors tend to adopt a variety of tactics that render technology commitments 'irreversible'. In general, this group of studies suggest the continuity of projects may also be linked to differences in status and to focused human efforts to protect such extant hierarchical structures. Hence our second research question in this paper is: How do status differences influence PICT project continuity? In the following sections, we present a review of the literature on institutional logics and status differences and their possible relevance to PICT projects.
Institutional Logics
The notion of institutional logics is a key concept in institutional theory. Thornton and Ocasio [44, p.804 ] define institutional logics as "the socially constructed, historical pattern of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their material substance, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality". In simpler terms, institutional logics are socially shared cultural beliefs and assumptions that shape the cognitions and behaviours of actors [27, 12] . When different groups in a setting adhere to different logics, agreements are difficult to reach and consensus can be elusive [12, 16, 49] . Groups may collaborate, compete, or choose to remain divided depending on the underlying beliefs of their respective institutional logics. Indeed, in a given institutional environment multiple institutional logics can compete [27, 40, 49] , resulting in one of three possible outcomes: (1) emergence of a single dominant logic [11] , (2) coexistence of multiple logics in the absence of a single dominant logic [36] and (3) short-lived dominant logics marked by constant change [45] .
In the specific case of PICT projects, research has shown how particular institutional logics may guide and influence implementation outcomes [9, 40, 49] . For example, in a study of a geographical information system (GIS) project in the Indian forestry sector, Walsham
and Sahay [49] demonstrated how an embedded political logic guided most forest management decisions, while at the same time a contradictory scientific-modelling logic prescribed GIS-enabled ways of managing forests. Walsham and Sahay [49] argued persuasively that the conflicts created by the simultaneous presence of these two logics had a detrimental effect on the performance of the GIS project. Similarly, in an action research project featuring an IT-enabled health management information system (HMIS) in Tajikistan, Sahay et al. [40] showed how attempts to replace a historically powerful set of institutional logics can be a futile exercise in the absence of support from influential political actors. This inability to replace and transform deeply embedded logics can indeed lead to the failure of well-intentioned projects [see 6]. More recently, some research has highlighted the possibility that the application of specific institutional logics may contribute to the continued underperformance of a PICT project. For example, in an empirical study of the Bangalore One project, Ravishankar [34] notes that a logic of 'ambiguity tolerance' employed by the private partners facilitated the continuity of the project at crucial junctures. Although this study focuses more on the successes of the project and does not explicitly refer to the term 'logic', it is evident in the paper that the same logic of ambiguity tolerance was also responsible for many of the poor outcomes of the project. Overall, it seems that the notion of institutional logics has the potential to add a novel and useful dimension to explanations of continuity. Therefore, as noted earlier, in this paper we explore its influence on PICT project continuity in greater detail.
Status differences
Status is "an effective claim to social esteem in terms of positive or negative privileges" [51, p. 305]. As Chen et al. [7] observe, hierarchies and differences in status permeate social and organizational life. According to them, there are two possible routes to social status: (a) dominance-based and (b) prestige-based. Dominance-based status -and by implication status differences -are realized and maintained by the application of 'coercion and aggression' whereas prestige-based status differences are created through 'respect, admiration, and deference'. Among the two, the former route is often blamed for poor outcomes of public projects. In other words, dominance-based approaches to maintaining status differences may push PICT projects to the brink [see 38].
While some scholars have argued that status differences have historically played a positive role in helping individuals to make cognitive adjustments and to manage their sense of self-entitlements [10] , others have shown how status differences negatively affect learning [5] , hinder multiparty collaboration [26, 35] and weaken performance of work-groups [3] .
Invariably, every social order is characterized by status hierarchies with some groups enjoying a super-ordinate status and others occupying a subordinate status [14, 41, 52] . (4) symbolic capital. Greater access to these capitals leads to a higher status and vice versa.
Kellogg [22] has argued that a high status group is threatened when a low status group starts competing for a set of resources hitherto reserved for the former. As a reaction to such 'status threats', the high status group may engage in a series of status quo maintaining actions.
Kellogg [22] refers to individuals in such high status groups who strive to maintain status quo in the event of a threat as internal defenders of status. A corollary of these arguments about status is that low status groups may also fight hard to improve their own status. These dynamics of status differences and threats are strongly reflected in the empirical sections of this paper as well. Despite their likely relevance to the implementation and sustainability of projects, in the broader management literature there appears to be very little published research on PICT projects and status differences. One notable exception is Sahay et al.'s [38] action-research based study of a health PICT project in Andhra Pradesh, India. This study showed how the entire machinery of the state was galvanized to support the continuity of a politically 'high status' family health information monitoring system (FHMIS), and to sabotage a relatively 'low status', but effective, district health information system (DHIS).
Similarly, research on continuity of ICT projects in the private sector point to ways in which the dynamics of status structures could be linked to the sustainability of projects. In a study of an expert IT system designed to help sales representatives, Keil [21] suggested that influential actors offer support and protection to failing projects because they help them in 'empire building' and equally, the termination of such projects could severely diminish their high status. These studies suggest that the notion of status differences can be a particularly useful analytical lens to apply to a study of PICT project continuity. They also raise the question of whether status differences could indeed remain unaltered forever [see 3, 41] .
In summary, a review of the literature shows that governments are moving towards an era of high investments in ICT in order to improve governance processes and delivery of public services. There is scant research into PICT projects that continue despite underperforming in several areas. In this paper we address this gap by drawing on the notions of institutional logics and status differences as theoretical lenses. In the next sections, we present an in depth case study of an Indian PICT project and examine the simultaneous influence of institutional logics and status differences on continuity.
Research Methods
As noted above, we conducted an in-depth case study. Our approach to the case study was informed by the interpretivist philosophy, which emphasizes the social construction of reality and focuses on the inter-subjective realities of actors [see 24, 48] . Our initial desk research gave us some pointers at a general level, about key issues that may emerge during the implementation of PICT projects. In the main, the literature suggested that the trajectory and continuity could be intimately connected with the embedded belief systems and the maintenance of status-related advantages for privileged groups. Thus, the notion of institutional logics and status differences served as broad sensitizing devices [47] for our study. In other words, while we expected them to provide some insights into PICT project continuity, we did not apriori hypothesize about the mechanisms and processes through which these sensitizing devices could influence project continuity.
Research setting
The PICT project refers to the implementation of a public ICT system in an Indian provincial state. We use the term 'state' in the rest of the paper to refer to this provincial state.
Four major types of groups are involved in the PICT project. These groups are summarized in Figure 1 and Table 1 They are situated at the local level, i.e. at the district and sub-district levels (see Fig. 1 below) .
Structurally, they mirror their respective GOV-S departments. 
Data collection
Our research interest in the PICT project was triggered by the frequent mentions it received in the Indian popular press. Interestingly, most of the commentaries and reports over the years seemed to be bemoaning the inability of the project to live up to its promise. We were keen to find out why the project was not doing well and what forces kept it going, given the reported shortcomings. Access to the project was negotiated through a senior official of the state's finance department, who was an acquaintance of the first author. In return for access to the different groups involved in the PICT project, we were asked to provide a written report of our findings. This report, which we submitted soon after the data collection process, contained our qualitative assessment of the implementation of the PICT project.
Broadly, this report outlined the findings presented in this paper, but was written less as an academic research paper and more as a list of recommendations for tackling the deeper problems facing the project. We collected four rounds of data during a nine-month period (see Table 2 below). believed were the challenges in engaging with the state (or local) groups. In order to get a better sense of the objectives of the project and current 'official' thinking about its implementation, we reviewed secondary sources of data such as internal reports and minutes of meetings. We were conscious that official printed reports could paint an overly rosy picture of the project's trajectory. During the interviews, we tried our best to verify the claims made in official documents with a range of informants at different hierarchical levels.
Data Collection GOV-S TRES-S GOV-L TRES-L

Data analysis
A key theme, which permeated our data, concerned the relative status of the various groups. Through a detailed line-by-line analysis of our interview data and field notes, we arrived at four status markers which described the underpinnings of the status differentials between the groups. We were alerted and guided to the status markers by informants who described major discrepancies and asymmetries in the allocation of resources. The status markers we identified were: access to funds, access to infrastructure, access to skilled human resources, and ICT-readiness. Subsequently, we categorised groups as high status and low status based on where they stood in terms of the status markers. At this stage, we again conducted a detailed analysis of our field notes and developed three interpretive concepts, which seemed to accurately represent the overarching belief systems prevalent in the institutional environment: bureaucratic, decentralization, and technocratic. These belief systems aligned closely with the theoretical notion of institutional logics and were either well-aligned with the objectives of the PICT project or went against its aspirations. We accordingly coded them as complementary logic and competing logic respectively.
Using this analysis we inductively built a tentative model to explain the influence of multiple institutional logics and status differences on the continuity of the project. We revisited the summaries and key quotes, and travelled back and forth iteratively from the data to the broader literature on PICT projects to look for possible alternative and additional explanations for continuity. During this phase of analysis, we found evidence of an additional influence on continuity. This concerned the agentic work of the low status groups, which also helped us better understand the nature of ground-level support available to the project. We incorporated this influence on continuity into the revised model. Through this process we augmented and strengthened our emerging model, until we reached a point where no further modifications seemed valuable. We thus developed our refined model and also ensured that a reasonable level of theory-data-model alignment was reached [see 32].
Case Description
The PICT project has been hailed as a precedent setter -at the time of its introduction there were no other similar deployments in India. The project began operations in 2003 and was extended to the state's local governments (the GOV-L groups) in 2007 with a view to providing these local bodies easy and transparent access to their allocated funds. Prior to the introduction of this project, the state's financial system faced a number of problems. For instance, the processing of bills, which were due for payment, was done manually. This led to many delays in updating budgets and issuing payments. GOV-L groups, which were scattered throughout the state, suffered the most as their requests for release of funds would get mired in this time-consuming process. In many cases, they would find that the money allocated to them had already been spent by another (usually their GOV-S counterpart) group. Indeed, it seemed the process of allocation of funds was severely skewed. Funds were mostly allocated on a first come first served basis leading to what can be termed as 'elite capture', i.e.
influential GOV-S groups often over-withdrew funds. There was no system of audit trails to keep a tab on such practices. There were numerous reports of funds allocated for public service programs at local levels being diverted to other unrelated expenditure. The PICT project intended to use ICT extensively to tackle such inefficiencies.
An overview of the PICT network topology and the process flow
The PICT project operates in a distributed client-server model. 
Findings
As noted above, the PICT project is just over a decade-old. It aims to improve transparency and equity, remove asymmetries in allocation of funds, devolve greater power and control to local groups and provide local groups with real-time access to their funds.
Although it intended to bring numerous benefits, in reality, the project has performed poorly in several areas. In particular, it has failed to provide GOV-L groups the opportunity to access funds in a timely and useful manner. The project's intention to devolve control to local groups has also remained largely unfulfilled. In this section, we explain the project's unfulfilled promises and the reasons for its continuity through an elaboration of the a)
prevailing institutional logics and b) significant differences in status between the state and local groups.
Institutional logics and the PICT project
In its implementation the PICT project was largely governed by the broader cultural norms and discourses operating in the institutional environment. There was a clear preference for strict top-down rules, tight central control of projects and imposition of bureaucratic procedures on local governments. In other words, a highly bureaucratic logic that believed in the virtues of central management of projects through formal rules and excessive procedures was applied to the PICT project. While they paid lip-service to the PICT project's objective of helping local governments, in practice the state groups used bureaucratic posturing and usurped most of the funds allocated to their department, rather than sharing it with their local group counterparts, as the project intended. Thus, the system of fund allocation continued to be skewed. As a GOV-S member put it:
Local governments are a nuisance. No work gets done. There is corruption and no
accountability. The quality of development is also poor. They are inefficient and incompetent. It is better when we are handling everything.
Furthermore, although GOV-L groups were key stakeholders in the project, they were not given real time, online access to their fund status via the PICT system. While the project required the state groups to invest funds and connect (via networked computers) GOV-L offices to the PICT network, they refused to do so. Also, by introducing many 'GOV-S and TRES-S approval required' clauses into the system, the state groups made the process of obtaining access to funds a time-consuming manual process for GOV-L. This often led to confusion and delays and affected planning at the local group level. In short, the use of a bureaucratic logic manifested via heavy bureaucratic posturing ensured that control remained with the state groups.
Although the bureaucratic logic frustrated their desire to have a bigger say in the implementation of the project, there were other institutional discourses that were clearly more favourable to the local groups. In particular, there was now a systemic belief in the values of decentralized forms of governance and administration. This focus on decentralization as a reasonable and legitimate way of administering public governance was provided constitutional impetus with the passing of a 'decentralization act' in 1992, which made it mandatory for state governments to create and nurture local governments. Thus, the institutional environment within which the development of the PICT system took place was also guided by a marked emphasis on decentralization. We may describe this as the decentralization logic. The local groups were strong adherents of the decentralization logic.
As a GOV-L member argued:
We know the local realities; we know what is best for us. Why can't the state government give us what is rightfully ours?
Local groups pointed out that their 'perceived' needs were too often envisioned by state bureaucrats, who they felt had an inadequate understanding of local needs. Seen against this backdrop, the idea of devolution of power via the PICT project was very appealing.
Local groups were committed to supporting this project, whose espoused objectives promised decentralization. Despite the continued problems created by the bureaucratic logic, they welcomed the project as an emancipatory tool of the future. In general, they viewed the project as an important manifestation of the state government's responsibility to bring the decentralization act into practice and to provide them with the resources necessary to function as effective local governments. This logic of decentralization also generated support for the PICT project in the local environment, even though in its current form the project did not live up to its promise. Despite complaints about how the project gave them very little control, the local groups felt that its noble aims also gave them hope for the future:
They say we will control things in the future. We feel that in the future the PICT project will certainly help us speed up our own work and give us more control over our funds. (GOV-L member).
The third overarching institutional logic that shaped and drove projects in this setting can be termed as the technocratic logic. Computerization of public services in India began in the mid-1990s. Since then there has been a growing sense of faith within the public sphere in the value and power of ICT tools. However, this technocratic logic is often taken to extremes wherein the implementation of an ICT project is seen as an end in itself, rather than as a means of delivering better governance. Thus, the technocratic logic was characterized by an unshakeable belief in the virtues of ICT. As a member of TRES-S noted:
The system is perfect, it is there, and tomorrow if someone asks me to change something I can't do anything about it. The system will do its job; it does not fail.
Some of the adjectives used by the GOV-S and TRES-S members to describe the PICT system were: "unfailing", "strong" and "perfect". Over a period, the PICT system had become a highly esteemed black box, not to be opened ever. The system was also imputed the characteristics of a faithful, trustworthy worker who never fails.
Clearly, multiple logics co-existed in the institutional environment. However, as explained above, not all logics were well-aligned with the aspirations of the PICT project.
The bureaucratic logic, in particular, was locked in a tense and contested relationship with the aims of the project. The PICT project aimed to devolve power to local groups. But the beliefs of the bureaucratic logic openly contradicted this objective. Put differently, the tight central control and concentration of power prescribed by the bureaucratic logic went against the very spirit of what the PICT project was aiming to achieve. We may thus term the bureaucratic logic as a competing logic. The technocratic logic, by definition, favoured and showed faith in ICT projects. The PICT project was one such project, which had an explicitly stated commitment to the extensive use of ICT to remove the distortions of the manual system. Therefore, the technocratic logic completely supported the PICT project. In view of its support to the project, we may consider the technocratic logic as a complementary logic.
Similarly, given its support for devolution of power to local governments, the decentralization logic was very well aligned with the aims of the PICT project. In this sense, we may view the decentralization logic too as a complementary logic. This categorization of the three logics is summarized in Table 3 below. 
Decentralization Complementary Both state and local groups
Belief in transferring power and control to local governments; emphasis on participatory planning and decentralized decision making.
Status differences and the PICT project
While institutional logics are one way of accounting for how the project has unfolded, the overarching status differences between the groups also help explain why the promised benefits to the local groups have not materialized. The state groups clearly enjoyed a much higher status than the local groups. As with many typical centre-local relationships, the status differentials were most vividly demonstrated in the preferential allocation of key resources to the former, which has continued even though the PICT project intends otherwise (see Table 4 below for a summary). Good access to human resources.
Markers of Status Differences
GOV-L TRES-L TRES-S GOV-S
ICT-readiness
Poor Poor Good Good Table 4 . A summary of the status differences
Although the local groups raised their own revenue, they largely depended on grants from the state groups to fund public services. GOV-S groups controlled both planning as well as budgetary allocations. On average only about 6-10% of the total expenditure incurred annually in the state was spent on the local groups. The state groups clearly had greater access to funds compared to the local groups. As a TRES-L member put it:
The power given to us is very limited […] as you can see for yourself we could do with improved working conditions […] but my hands are tied […] for sanctioning bigger amounts I have to pass it to my higher ups. GOV-S has to come into the picture.
If there is an urgent need, I just cannot do anything about it.
While the state groups could access and disburse funds easily, there was a cap on the discretionary funds allocated to the local groups, a small figure that had not been revised for more than a decade. The state groups had better access to infrastructure. By infrastructure, we refer to the supporting facilities, which enable the effective use of the PICT system. Even at the time of our data collection, local groups were only given a stand-alone application which generated all the data. This data had to be delivered manually to the nearest TRES-L office, which in the majority of cases was accomplished using antiquated floppy diskettes, a practice that hadn't changed for over a decade. These arrangements were hardly ideal. As GOV-L members observed:
See, for any minor correction we have to send someone multiple times over.
Sometimes if the problem cannot be solved at the TRES-L level there is no way we can resolve it sitting here. We have to make trips to XXXX, the administrative capital city of the state. We would not have this problem if we had networked computers at our office.
and
Many times when we send the data to the treasury (TRES-L), they say the floppies are not working. So we even end up spending our own money to buy floppies.
These difficulties of the local groups were in stark contrast to the privileges enjoyed by the state-level groups. The offices of the GOV-S groups were located in the same large modern city where TRES-S's office was also located. Furthermore, given the better access to funds, they used more reliable data transfer technology such as a USB flash memory. The local groups were also particularly affected by the frequent and arbitrary transfer of knowledgeable employees. On many occasions TRES-L members, who had reasonable expertise in managing and operating the PICT system were transferred without warning to a completely different government body by the state groups. Coupled with inadequate training and capacity building programs, these arbitrary transfers ensured that the local groups were always short of skilled human resources. Although they were the operators of the PICT system at the local level, TRES-L groups received very little training on the system. The following quote from a state group bureaucrat exemplifies these problems: An important fall-out of the differential access to resources was that the ICT-readiness of the local groups remained at a fairly basic level. By ICT-readiness, we refer to the ability and willingness of the state and local groups to use ICT. In particular, GOV-L members were unfamiliar with ICT and had serious difficulties in adapting to computerized systems. This had the unfortunate effect of further widening existing status gaps. The state groups now viewed themselves as expert users of the PICT system while expressing scorn at the perceived failings of the local groups and looking down upon them. In the words of a GOV-S member:
We now upload all orders signalling release of funds online on our website, but still the GOV-L groups wait for the hard copy of the order to arrive to begin work! They believe the hard copy is more authentic.
Thus, the processes of release and utilization of funds was invariably delayed. While GOV-L members complained about the delays and the poor access to infrastructure, GOV-S members were quick to patronize, pointing to the lackadaisical attitude and poor ICT skills of GOV-L members.
Institutional logics, Status differences and Continuity
Informants at the state group level admitted they had felt threatened initially by the aspirations of the PICT project to devolve control and power to the local groups. They were worried about a potential upgrading of the local groups' statuses and a corresponding downgrading of their own status. They responded to this perception of threat by excessive bureaucratic posturing, which allowed them to control and dominate the local groups. As a
GOV-S member boasted:
There are about Rs 8000 crores (about US$135 million) worth of schemes and programs which can be handed over to the local governments. These schemes were earlier a part of the local governments. But now we have taken them back and will
continue to take control of such schemes.
In other words, taking advantage of the logic of a centralized bureaucracy, the state groups adopted a high-handed approach and appropriated funds meant for programs at the local level. Thus, the state groups made sure that the PICT project did not pose them any problems. In fact, they supported the project in its current form because it allowed them to continue to dominate the local groups. By their bureaucratic posturing, they were able to maintain their high status vis-à-vis the local groups:
There is nothing really wrong with the project. We still retain control. We want the project to continue. (GOV-S member)
Indeed, the local groups felt that the PICT project has served as a tool of control for the state groups. The following two quotes from GOV-L members capture the frustration of the local groups:
We don't even have control over our own funds. It was evident that the local groups were drawing on the decentralization and technocratic logics and negotiating for a better status. A strong belief in the virtues of these logics has led them to negotiate vociferously for their rights. Some local group informants also suggested that the implementation of the PICT project further reinforced and promoted the values of decentralization and technocracy.
Why do we continue to support the project? Because it gives us hope and optimism. It gives us a starting point to negotiate and aspire for better access to financial resources
In short, the local groups viewed the PICT project as a vehicle of decentralization and technocracy. They endorsed the project and were prepared to overlook its current weaknesses because it promised long-term improvements to their status. Despite the misalignment between institutional logics (e.g., between the bureaucratic logic and the decentralization logic) and the prevailing status-related tensions, the local groups focused on (as a GOV-L member put it) 'working with the project'. While fighting against its ongoing distortions and failings, they mobilized resources at the local level to ensure that in its existing form the project at least served their immediate objectives. For instance, some local officials enforced adhoc corrective procedures to curb malpractices. A GOV-L member illustrated: Thus, despite its underperformance the PICT project continued on account of (a) the support it received from the institutionally ratified decentralization and technocratic logics, (b) the support it received from the state groups, a support linked to the fact that they were able to use bureaucratic posturing and continue their domination of local groups and (c) the support it received from the local groups, who believed the project was helping them reduce extant status differences.
The PICT project continuity model
Drawing on our analysis above, we next build a PICT project continuity model, which depicts and explains the simultaneous influence of multiple institutional logics and status differences on continuity. The model is presented in Fig. 4 below. Despite the presence of the favourably oriented decentralization and technocratic logics, the project faced the full brunt of the bureaucratic posturing of the state groups resulting in underperformance on several fronts. We would therefore argue that a competing bureaucratic logic, which allows for serious bureaucratic posturing can contribute to a PICT project's poor performance (see Fig.   4 ). At the same time, the complementary logics of technocracy and decentralization fully supported the project's aspirations to use ICT, devolve power and ensure equity. Thus, we argue that by virtue of being key cognitive schemas in the institutional environment, complementary logics enable PICT project continuity (see Figure 4) .
Figure 4. PICT project continuity model
There is another way to think about the underperformance of PICT projects. This explanation incorporates the role played by status differences. In our case, the state groups had a clear agenda. They wanted to maintain their high status for as long as possible. Their intention was threatened to the extent that the PICT project desired to decentralize control and power to the local groups. In response to such 'status threats' (see Figure 4 ) the state groups employed bureaucratic posturing (for e.g., they re-appropriated funds meant to be disbursed to the local groups). Thus, we may suggest that high status groups' bureaucratic posturing leads to the poor performance of PICT projects. However, as highlighted in our analyses and depicted in Figure 4 , the same high status groups also support the continuity of the project because they are able to apply the bureaucratic logic and maintain status quo.
Similarly the complementary logics can engender 'status aspirations' (see Figure 4) among the low status groups and lead them to support the continuation of the project. Drawing on the model above we propose that continuity can exist at two different levels: (1) the policy level and (2) the operational level.
Policy-level continuity
The decentralization and technocracy logics not only co-existed [see 36], but were also fully in sync with the objectives of the PICT project. In other words, these logics were strongly embedded in the institutional environment and supported the continuity of the project as a policy intervention, notwithstanding its underperformance. We may therefore refer to such a logics-driven continuity of the project as policy-level continuity. This suggests that as complementary logics gain a powerful foothold in the institutional landscape, they support and sustain PICT projects at a policy level. Our analysis also illustrates an important point about the framing of policy-level continuity. Despite its continuity as a policy intervention, the PICT project did not meet several of its objectives. The arguments about poor performance incorporate an inclusive view of continuity that also captures the perspective of the local groups. From the perspective of the state groups, however, the PICT project can be mostly viewed as a 'policy success'. By and large, they were able to establish control over what they viewed as 'adversarial' local groups. This shows how the framing of policy-level continuity in high status groups may openly contradict its framing in low status groups.
Operational-level continuity
At an everyday operational-level, both the state groups and the local groups worked with and supported the PICT project. The state groups drew on the bureaucratic logic and shaped the PICT project into a system that froze and maintained the existing status 
Theoretical contributions
The literature suggests that the continuity of underperforming PICT projects could be underpinned by supportive institutional norms and beliefs [6, 34] . The notion of complementary logics introduced in this paper demonstrates the structure and process of such an institutional-level support. However, the 'underperformance' dimension of continuity electronic media and public policy think tanks) in other contexts [34, 38, 39] . The presence of competing logics also draws attention to the role of human actors in the application of institutional logics [see 25, 44] . In institutional theory, logics are often viewed as socially shared cultural beliefs and assumptions, which inevitably guide action [27, 45] . Human actors are supposed to act strictly in accordance with the dominant logic in their institutional environment. The actions of the state groups, in our case, however, suggest that a more manipulative and calculating use of logics is also possible in an environment where multiple institutional logics prevail. Actors may deliberately employ a logic, which they are sure is in their self-interest (e.g., bureaucratic logic) and wilfully desist from invoking a logic, which might require them to give up some privileges (e.g., decentralization logic). Thus, while some processes of structuration [2, 13] were manifest in actors' (e.g. high status groups') reliance on institutional norms and practices, from a theoretical standpoint their actions also imply that human agency may reflexively take status hierarchies into account when deciding on which normative structure to apply in a given situation [see 53].
The complementary-competing logics highlighted in our study also throw light on the possible contradictions inherent in the implementation of a PICT project. Robey and Boudreau [37] argued that consequences of IT can be better explained by a logic of opposition (i.e. by examining forces both promoting change and impeding change). They suggest that IT implementations face opposing normative pressures. Our case empirically demonstrates the effects of such opposing institutional norms on the continuity of PICT projects. In any given institutional environment, complementary logics promote the changes a project is trying to bring about. However, the degree to which the project's goals are met may crucially depend on institutional forces, which defy the project. Put differently, the intensity and strength of competing logics -applied to pursue goals that openly contradict the changes desired by a project -can have a significant bearing on outcomes [12, 27] . Hence, we would argue that stronger the legitimacy enjoyed by competing logics, greater the likelihood of a project's continued poor performance.
Turning to the role of status differences in the continuity of underperforming PICT projects, our analysis illustrates how high status actors may offer their whole-hearted support to a project if they are able to shape and control its trajectory in ways that maintain current status hierarchies. While this insight is in line with earlier work [e.g., 1, 21, 22], our analysis also raises the possibility that low status groups too may support projects for long-periods of time when they frame it as a harbinger of positive change and as a symbol of hope for the future. They may recognize and come to accept that promised changes will be delivered in a laborious and long-drawn out process, even as they engage in everyday negotiations aimed at status upgrades.
In a recent paper, Karanasios and Allen [20] • Complementary logics had a significant positive influence on the policylevel continuity of the PICT project.
• The application of a competing logic was responsible for the underperformance of the PICT project.
• PICT project continuity can be conceptualized as a consequence of the interplay of opposing institutionallevel forces.
• Human actors deliberately invoke competing logics to protect their interests and to retain greater control over a project's future.
• Entities that call upon competing logics are more likely to get away with their actions in settings that suffer from institutional voids.
Likely influence of human efforts to maintain and build status asymmetries on how PICT projects unfold [1, 21, 22 ].
• High status groups supported the PICT project's operational-level continuity because they were able to shape the trajectory of the project to their advantage.
• Low status groups supported the PICT project's operational-level continuity because they believed the project would reduce extant status differences.
• Contrasting status-related motivations drive different groups to support the continuity of the same PICT project.
• Continued underperformance of a project could be intimately connected with on-going processes of status negotiation. 
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have provided insights into the simultaneous influence of institutional logics and status asymmetries on PICT project continuity. We have also proposed a data-driven model that explains this process in-depth. The 'poor performance' dimension of continuity raises some troubling questions about the governance of PICT projects. The experience of our case suggests that the announcement and initiation of an ambitious project is often seen as an end in itself and equated with success. We would argue that it is equally, if not more, important for policy designers to show a commitment to setting up independent mechanisms of governance that oversee the implementation and orchestrate the intentions of PICT projects. In the absence of effective structures of governance, continuity can end up shielding many poorly functioning projects [34] . There may also be a tendency within governmental agencies to view a continuing PICT project as evidence that all stakeholders are well-served by it. We would argue that practitioners need to 'keep their ears to the ground' and interact frequently with low status groups in order to better manage the trajectory of PICT projects. Practitioners can over-estimate the power and reach of complementary logics to influence project outcomes and under-estimate the potency of competing logics to cause trouble. Our case suggests that in order to steer PICT projects towards reasonable outcomes it may be crucial for policy makers to be extremely sensitive to the dynamics of competing logics that can sabotage projects.
Notwithstanding its contributions, our paper has several limitations. Due to issues of access, we could not ascertain the views of the commercial vendors, who contributed to the implementation of the PICT project. They would have almost certainly given us more insights into the development process and the role played by state and local groups. Although none of our interviewees mentioned it as an issue, we acknowledge that in some contexts a PICT project may continue mainly because of the high switching costs involved in changing to a different ICT system. In other words, competing standards in software, hardware and telecommunications may act as a barrier for users to seamlessly move from one ICT system to another and may thus have a significant impact on continuity. We have not explored this dimension of continuity in any detail in our paper and would suggest that it is a worthwhile avenue for future research. Despite the negative portrayal of the bureaucratic logic in the empirical sections above, we acknowledge that some form of bureaucracy is actually a prerequisite for delivering public governance. It is only when the bureaucratic principles are applied in very rigid and dogmatic ways that PICT projects may hurtle towards poor performance. We have drawn on a single, intensive case of a PICT project in one Indian provincial state. While our findings may resonate with some countries with comparable administrative and governance systems, it clearly will not do so in all cases. Therefore, we would caution our readers before generalizing from this study to other contexts. We call for more empirical work to better understand the nature of PICT project continuity in other countries.
Although we have employed two interesting and important theoretical lenses, they are hardly exhaustive given the complexity and diversity of different implementation settings.
Future work needs to explore in greater detail other possible influences on continuity such as the political embeddedness of projects and the role of private sector partners in delivering public services [6] . For instance, it would be interesting to see how continuity is affected 
